C///

\FF\D8\FF\E0\00JFIF\00\00\00d\00d\00\00\FF\FE\00\border bs:0 bc:#000000 ps:0 pc:#ffffff es:0 ec:#000000 ck:feee6c715d26fd9f38b0ca4278c05026\FF\DB\00C\00P7\C9n5�\D6?\BD�\9Ds\EBp\9F[`8m\B7)o\B5\E8\E6I\99\FE3]]A2\BA\8Cw\D6E\93\\DEv\C8\009\F2\F1NI?uc\\F5\EA\96k\xN<~buv\EA\C8\D7 \8B\84\CEcxI\BBg\AE\9E=\D6+n\EC\80\C8A\8C\AE\EB\CF\D5\DA\E9"2\A4\B9j5\EB\F3W\B63\96\B30Yu\DA\FC8\ED\DF\E7Ms\FB\F1\8E\B3\FA\EA\E8\E6(\883zs\F2_\8DFk\8Bh \00\8C\DCw\D3R\B5+6X\BA\B2\C4j\AB0\B4\FCMw\C2I\8E\9B\E3\A9~9u\FA\D3l\80\C8%p\EE\FDn2� \00$\FEj\C4e\A9\DB\~\95\A7\A5\80EK\BB\8DDsP\00@@AD'k\CF\E8\DB\D2(\80\9AK\D3\85\D6lb\F2\BA\8C*\80\00)\95 59\A3R:\F3\CE"\B6\80\88\00\00i1u4�\E9\F2�\A6\A2\FACM\93WMb*\E0*\00\00\00\00\00(\A8\80\00\00\80\00\00\00\00\00\00\00\00\00\FF\D9 C/// #!/bin/bash ##CageFS proxyexec wrapper - ver 18 if [[ $EUID -eq 0 ]]; then echo 'Cannot be run as root' exit 1 fi USR=`/usr/bin/whoami` USER_TOKEN_PATH="/var/.cagefs/.cagefs.token" WEBSITE_ISOLATION_FLAG="/opt/cloudlinux/flags/enabled-flags.d/website-isolation.flag" # Trust boundary for the website-isolation token path: it must point # directly at the regular file that create_website_token_directory() # creates inside its root-owned per-user storage area. That area is # /var/cagefs///.cagefs/website/... on the host and is # bind-mounted into the cage at /var/.cagefs/website/... — both views # are accepted because libenter.enter_site() picks one or the other # depending on whether it runs inside or outside the cage. The file # itself is never a symlink, so we reject symlinks outright rather # than canonicalizing with realpath. Without this gate the attacker # controls both the env var WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH and the file contents # at that path; the file contents land in $TOKEN, which is embedded # into the ssh remote command argv below and re-parsed by the remote # shell — so shell metacharacters in the file would execute on the # origin host. (Slite #7 / CLOS-4490) if [[ -f "$WEBSITE_ISOLATION_FLAG" && -n "$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" ]]; then if [[ -L "$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" ]]; then echo "cagefs.proxy: WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH '$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH' must not be a symlink" >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ ! -f "$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" ]]; then echo "cagefs.proxy: WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH '$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH' is not an existing regular file" >&2 exit 1 fi # Reject `..` as a path component so the prefix check below cannot # be bypassed via traversal (e.g. /var/cagefs/../etc/passwd matches # the /var/cagefs/* glob but resolves outside the trusted area). case "$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" in */../*|*/..) echo "cagefs.proxy: WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH '$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH' must not contain '..' path components" >&2 exit 1 ;; esac case "$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" in /var/cagefs/*|/var/.cagefs/*) ;; *) echo "cagefs.proxy: WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH must be under /var/cagefs/ or /var/.cagefs/ (got '$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH')" >&2 exit 1 ;; esac USER_TOKEN_PATH="$WEBSITE_TOKEN_PATH" fi # The -L/-f/prefix gate above is defense-in-depth, TOCTOU is not exploitable because the # forwarded $TOKEN must still equal the legit on-disk bytes that the # origin's cagefs.server reads with open(..., O_NOFOLLOW) from a # uid-derived path (see find_website_by_token() in # proxyexec/cagefs.server.c) — a swapped symlink redirects what we # cat, never what the server reads, so a TOCTOU substitution can only # r